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506 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
VENUE UNDER THE CORPORATE REORGANIZA-
TIONS ACT
By LYMAN MARK TONDEL, JR.*
I NTRODUCTION
N the course of his critical history of the reorganization in
equity of the Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Railroad,
Max Lowenthal pointed out the care with which the lawyers for
the petitioner in that case selected the tribunal which they wished
to supervise the receivership proceedings.1 It was there shown
how, since any one of many courts could take jurisdiction,2 the
attorneys instituted suit in that court where the decided law was
most favorable to their clients' interests and before that judge who
was most likely to appoint their nominees to the all-important
posts of receivers.
As will be shown later petitions under section 77B of the Na-
tional Bankruptcy Act, commonly known as the Corporate Re-
organization Act, may be filed in any of several courts. Where it
would be best to file the petition in any given case remains a prac-
tical problem of the first magnitude. The choice of court at the
outset frequently will determine whether the judge will approve
the petition as filed in good faith; whether he will be favorable to
the petitioners' nominees for receivers or trustees; whether he will
be sufficiently informed concerning financial problems generally,
and the affairs of the intended "debtor" in particular, to be able
to supervise intelligently, pending reorganization, the administra-
tion of the estate; whom the judge will be likely to appoint as
masters; whether he will be likely to confirm a plan favorable to
the petitioners; and whether the compensation of counsel, trustees,
and committees will be inadequate, reasonable, or extravagant.
As is readily seen the varying attitudes of judges with respect
to these problems and the opportunity of counsel to choose which
*A.B. University of Washington; student in the Law School of Harvard
University. This paper was prepared for a graduate course in Corporation
Finance conducted by Prof. E. Merrick Dodd.1Lowenthal, The Investor Pays, 112 ff.21n federal equity proceedings a consent receivership could be instituted
in any federal district in the country. Central Trust Co. v. McGeorge,
(1894) 151 U. S. 129, 14 Sup. Ct. 286, 38 L. Ed. 98.
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judge shall supervise a particular reorganization gives great lee-
way to both conscientious and unscrupulous lawyers in achieving
their respective ends. The former may seek that court whose
forum is most convenient to all parties and witnesses, and the judge
whose wisdom and familiarity with the debtor's problems will be
conducive to the soundest and fairest administration and reorgani-
zation. On the other hand lawyers whose only end is their own
advancement may select that judge who will approve their nom-
inees as receivers or trustees without regard to merit; whose
blindness or ignorance will enable the petitioners to administer the
estate and reorganize the corporation in their own interests; and
who may be counted on to allow disproportionately large fees.
It is therefore of the greatest importance to determine where
petitions may be filed under section 77B, and what provisions
there are to guard against those who would misuse the alterna-
tives preserved for them under the Act. It is also important to
consider certain conflicts of jurisdiction which have arisen, and
what means there may be of avoiding them in the future.
WHERE A PETITION MAY BE FILED
The Act provides that the debtor shall file its petition "with
the court in whose territorial jurisdiction the corporation, during
the preceding six months or the greater portion thereof, has had
it principal place of business or its principal assets, or in any
territorial jurisdiction in the State in which it was incorporated. 13
The location of the debtor's principal place of business was a
basis of jurisdiction under Section 2 of the original Bankruptcy
Act.4 The great volume of cases which arose under section 2
involving the question of where a particular corporate debtor's
principal place of business was located, provide a sizable body of
precedent to aid in the solution of the same problem under section
77B. A large proportion of those cases dealt with corporations
which were incorporated or had offices in one state but operated
their plants in other states. It was quite uniformly held that it
was not the technical domicile, nor the location of the sales- or
3Section 77B(a), found in (1934) 48 Stat. at L. 912. 11 U. S. C. A. sec.
207(a) (Supp. 1935). For an early comment on the meaning of this pro-
vision see Weiner, Corporate Reorganization: Section 77B of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 1173, 1175.
4Section 2(1), found in (1898) 30 Stat. 545, 11 U. S. C .A. sec 11.
5In re Devonian Spring Co., (D.C. N.D. Ohio 1920) 272 Fed. 527; In
re R. C. Stanley Shoe Co., (D.C. N.H. 1934) 8 F. Supp. 681.
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executive offices,' nor the location of the corporate records,7 nor
the residence of the dominating stockholder,8 which determined the
principal place of business, but rather the place where most of the
business was conducted, for the carrying on of which the corpora-
tion was chartered, whether it were manufacturing, mining, sell-
ing, or transportation.9 However, where most of the business
was actually carried on from the executive offices, their location
was held to be controlling. 10
The courts treated this question as one of fact," and not as
a question of corporate intention. 2  By the terms of section 77B
the question of fact, if properly raised, is for the judge to decide
summarily. 3 There are certain procedural aids which the cases
provide him. Some courts have declared that if a corporation speci-
ties in its charter that a certain locality is to be its principal place
6In re E. & G. Theatre Co., (D.C. Mass. 1915) 223 Fed. 657; In re
American & British Mfg. Corp., (D.C. Conn. 1924) 300 Fed. 839.
7In re Worcester Footwear Co., (D.C. Mass. 1918) 251 Fed. 760.8In re Pusey & Jones Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1922) 286 Fed. 88.91n re Elmira Steel Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1901) 109 Fed. 456; In re Perry
Aldrich Co., (D.C. Mass. 1908) 165 Fed. 249; In re Tygarts River Coal
Co., (D.C. W.Va. 1913) 203 Fed. 178; Home Powder Co. v. Geis, (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1913) 204 Fed. 568; In re Beiermeister Bros. Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1913)
208 Fed. 945; In re San Antonio Land and Irrigation Co., (D.C. N.Y.
1916) 228 Fed. 984; Continental Coal Corp. v. Rozelle Bros., (C.C.A.
6th Cir. 1917) 242 Fed. 243; In re Monarch Oil Corp., (D.C. Ohio 1920)
272 Fed. 524; Dryden v. Ranger Refining & Pipe Line Co., (C.C.A. 5th Cir.
1922) 280 Fed. 257; Lawrence v. Atlantic Paper & Pulp Corp., (C.C.A.
5th Cir. 1924) 298 Fed. 246; In re Hudson River Nay. Corp., (C.C.A. 2d
Cir. 1932) 59 F. (2d) 971; See also In re Thomas McNally Co., (D.C.
N.Y. 1913) 208 Fed. 291; In re New Era Novelty Co., (D.C. N.J. 1916)
241 Fed. 298.
A similar problem was involved in those cases where the location of a
bankrupt individual's principal place of business was involved. In re Brice.,
(D.C. Iowa 1899) 93 Fed. 942; In re Plotke, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1900) 104
Fed. 964; In re Mackey, (D.C. Del. 1901) 110 Fed. 355; In re Knox,
(C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1926) 11 F. (2d) 743; Milwaukee Corrugating Co. v.
Flagge, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1927) 19 F. (2d) 518.
loIn re Matthews Consolidated Slate Co., (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1906) 144
Fed. 737; In re Guanacevi Tunnel Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1912) 201 Fed. 316.
The executive offices have also been held to be the principal place of business
where the plant has not been operating for six months prior to the bank-
ruptcy proceedings. In re Marine Machine & Conveyor Co., (D.C. N.Y.
1899) 91 Fed. 630; In re Pennsylvania Consol. Coal Co., (D.C. Pa. 1908)
163 Fed. 579.
"Continental Coal Corp. v. Rozelle Bros., (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1917) 242
Fed. 243; see Chicago Bank of Commerce v. Carter, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1932)
61 F. (2) 986.
"2In re San Antonio Land & Irrigation Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1916) 228
Fed. 984.
"sSection 77B(a), found in (1934) 48 Stat. at L. 913, 11 U. S. C. A.
sec. 207(a) (Supp. 1935), says in part: "The judge shall determine sum-
marily the issues presented by the pleadings, without the intervention of a
jury." See In re Cheney Bros., (D.C. Conn. 1935) 12 F. Supp. 609, 611.
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of business, the burden of proof is on any party which alleges the
principal place of business to be at another place.1 Other courts
have made it clear, however, that such a designation is not controll-
ing.15 It has also been judicially propounded that if a corpora-
tion formally indicates in its petition or elsewhere that it regards
one place as its principal place of business, the burden of proof
is there also shifted to those who contest that indication. 0 It is
well that these rules help to make the determination of the principal
place of business as speedy as possible. Expediency is vital in
the realm of reorganizations, for the occasion for such proceedings
is almost invariably, an emergency, and their protraction is costly.
Three cases under section 77B have raised the question of
how to determine the location of a corporation's principal place
of business. In ln re Consolidated Gas Utilities Co."7 the court
was faced with the solution of this problem with respect to a
holding company which had subsidiaries in Texas, Kansas, and
Oklahoma, engaged in the production and distribution of natural
gas. Its president and secretary had their offices in Oklahoma
City; its "books of account, primary records, original title papers,
contracts," and abstracts were kept there; from that office it di-
rected the operations of its subsidiaries. All the debtor's securi-
ties except those which were pledged, including the capital stock
of its subsidiaries, were kept in Oklahoma City. Its minute books
were kept in New York City, and its directors' meetings were
held there. On these facts the court found that the holding com-
pany's principal place of business was in Oklahoma City. This
result is in accord with the earlier cases which held that the execu-
tive offices were the principal place of business if they were the
scene of the bulk of the corporation's activities.
The subsequent case of In re Syndicate Oil Corporation,t8
which came up before the same court, raised the problem of
14In re Tennessee Constr. Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1914) 213 Fed. 33;
In re R. H. Pennington & Co., (D.C. Ky. 1915) 228 Fed. 388; In re
Devonian Spring Co., (D.C. Ohio, 1920) 272 Fed. 527.
15 n re Wenatchee-Stratford Orchard Co., (D.C. Wash. 1913) 205 Fed.
964; In re Beiermeister Bros. Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1913) 208 Fed. 945; Lawrence
v. Atlantic Paper & Pulp Corp., (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1924) 298 Fed. 246.
261n re Guanacevi Tunnel Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1912) -01 Fed. 316;
Lawrence v. Atlantic Paper & Pulp Corp., (C.C.A. Sth Cir. 1924) 298 Fed.
246; In re Lone Star Shipbuilding Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1925) 6 F. (2d)
192; In re Hudson River Navigation Corp., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1932) 59 F.
(2d) 971.,
17(D.C. Del. 1934) 8 F. Suipp. 385.
's(D.C. Del. 1934) 9 F. Supp. 127.
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whether the debtor's field activities and properties in the West,
or its executive offices in Rochester, N. Y., where its president
and general manager had their offices, and where the primary
records were kept, constituted the principal place of business. The
court held that the latter facts were determinative. This decision
is at first glance contrary to the bulk of the decisions under section
2 of the Bankruptcy Act. However, in the Syndicate Oil Case
the officers in the Rochester office exercised active control over
the properties, operations, and employees in the West. They exe-
cuted all contracts, drew all checks, prepared all financial state-
ments, and decided upon the drilling of new wells. There may
thus have been greater reason in this case for the court to hold
the executive office to be the principal place of business. Re-
organizers should nevertheless take warning from this case, that
the location of the supervisory rather than that of the physical
activities may be found by some courts to be the principal place
of a corporation's business.
More in accord with the precedents was the decision in Wal-
ters v. Hamilton Gas Co.19 In that case almost all the field and
office activities of the debtor gas company had been conducted
for at least two years in West Virginia. The management had
been in the hands of receivers whose offices were in West Virginia.
The disgruntled former president of the debtor had meanwhile
maintained his old offices in New York City. The court found no
difficulty in holding that the principal place of business was in
West Virginia.
The location of the debtor's principal assets as a basis of
jurisdiction is an innovation under section 77B. Although no
cases have yet been reported which have raised the question of
where the principal assets may be said to be located, it would
seem evident that this also is a question of fact for the judge, to
be determined in each case by an examination of the territorial
distribution of the corporate assets. It is worthy of note that in
most of the older decisions in which the courts sought to define
"principal place of business," the location of the bulk of the cor-
porate assets was the basis for determining the "principal place
of business," even though executive offices were located elsewhere.
19(D.C. W.Va. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 323, upon remand from Hamilton
Gas Co. v. Watters, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1935) 75 F. (2d) 176, writ of certiorari
denied Dec. 9, 1935, In re Hamilton Gas Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1935) 79
F. (2d) 97.
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Under section 77B the definition thus adopted would frequently
reduce the number of courts in which petitions could be filed, by
making the location of "principal assets" and "principal place of
business" synonymous.
It is unfortunate that these tests of proper venue are so in-
definite. Where nation-wide debtor corporations such as chains
of theaters or mercantile houses seek relief under section 77B, it
will frequently be an extremely difficult question of fact where
their principal assets and principal places of business are located. .-
Usually the debtor will not be alone in seeking relief. In the
same or other courts various groups of creditors will file their
petition. To avoid unseemly contests between courts for juris-
diction and the delays of long-continued appeals, conscientious
judges will want to be sure theirs is a proper venue before approv-
ing a petition. Detailed inquiries into the facts will be the result,
and the proceedings, in which speed is especially important, will
be extended indefinitely. If less controversial tests of jurisdiction
could be devised, which would be as likely as those set forth in
the Act to represent the best qualified forum, the amendment of
section 77B to include them rather than the present controversial
tests would be a boon to corporate reorganizations. Such a test
might be the territorial jurisdiction where the greatest number of
the debtor's employees reside; or where the greatest number of
the corporation's debtors and creditors reside; or where the debtor
owns, leases, or operates for business purposes property, both real
and personal, of the greatest actual value as determined by the
state tax assessors for the year preceding the filing of the petition;
or a computation -based on several such criteria. It might also
be provided that a court would have jurisdiction, regardless of
other factors, if it had, more than a month previously, appointed
primary receivers of the debtor corporation.
May a corporation still have a principal place of business
although it has been in the hands of a receiver for six months
prior to the filing of the petition? This question has twice been
answered in the affirmative by the courts under section 77B.21 In
20For an example of the difficult questions of fact which may arise, see
the elaborate master's report in In re Pusey & Jones Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir.
1922) 286 Fed. 88.
211n re Consolidated Gas Utilities Co., (D.C. Del. 1934) 8 F. Supp.
385; Watters v. Hamilton Gas Co., (D.C. W.Va. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 323,
330. See Hamilton Gas Co. v. Watters, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1935) 75 F. (2d)
176, 182.
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both cases, however, the receiver continued to operate the business
and did not merely liquidate the assets. This result is in accord
with that reached by most courts tinder section 2 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. Where the receivers continued to administer the
affairs of the corporation, it was held still to have a "principal
place of business. ' 2   However, where receivers were ordered to
liquidate the assets the corporation was said no longer to have a
princip.l place of business. 23  Presumably this same line of de-
cisions would be followed if the location of the "principal assets"
were the question involved.
A petition may also be filed under section 77B in "any ter-
ritorial jurisdiction in the state in which it was incorporated."'"
This provision had a tumultuous legislative history.2 1 It was
ardently urged as a means of fixing a sure test of venue where
there was a dispute as to where the principal assets or principal
place of business were situated. It was as bitterly opposed because
so frequently the state of incorporation contains none of the of-
fices, or records, or officers of the corporation. In the end the
former view prevailed, but the provision which allows the transfer
of proceedings (to be considered hereafter) was inserted as a
sop for the adherents to the latter view.20
In the only case which has been reported arising directly under
this clause the judge decided that a petition may be filed in one
district court in the state in which the debtor was incorporated,
although its principal assets are in the territory of another district
court within the same state.27 This result was within the clear
meaning of the Act. The reason Congress specifically allowed a
petition to be filed in any district within the state of incorporation
is set forth in the following language of Tom D. McKeown, who
In re E. & G. Theatre Co., (D.C. Mass. 1915) 223 Fed. 657; In re
Monarch Oil Corp., (D.C. Ohio 1920) 272 Fed. 524; Royal Indemnity Co.
v. American Bond and Mortgage Co., (1933) 289 U. S. 165, 53 Sup. Ct.
551, 77 L. Ed. 1100; In re American & British Mfg. Corp., (D.C. Conn.
1924) 300 Fed. 839.
231n re Perry Aldrich Co., (D.C. Mass. 1908) 165 Fed. 249.
-
4Section 77B(a) found in (1934) 48 Stat. at L. 912, 11 U. S. C. A.
sec. 207(a) (Supp. 1935).
26For a criticism of the result of the tumult see Weiner, Corporate
Reorganization: Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, (1934) 34 Col. L.
Rev. 1173, 1196.
26(1934) H. R. Rep. No. 1773, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. No. 9776.
p. 5; Hanna, Corporate Reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act, (1935)
21 A. B. A. J. 73, 75.
27(D.C. Ill. Aug. 9, 1934) In re Flamingo Hotel Co., C. C. H. Bank-
ruptcy Service, Par. 3007.
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was chairman of the sub-committee of the House at the time of
the drafting and enactment of the debtor relief laws:
"The provision of the Act permitting the filing of the petition
in any district of the state 6f incorporation, without regard to the
principal place of business, if any, of the corporation within that
state, was the result of a carefully thought-out plan by the commit-
tee which drafted this Act. The committee had before it the
situations in a number of the large cities where the federal courts
are badly overworked, and are sometimes the object of imposition
of foreclosure or bankruptcy rings within these cities. The pur-
pose of this provision was to permit application for reorganization
to be made to the country districts in these states, and avoid the
delay and possible complications that might arise in the large
cities."3
28
The three bases of jurisdiction thus far set forth may not be
exclusive. The Act provides that a petition may be filed in any
proceeding pending in bankruptcy. 9  Section 2, clause 1 of the
Bankruptcy Act allows proceedings in bankruptcy to be instituted
against a foreign corporation in any jurisdiction in which it holds
property, where the corporation's principal place of business is
not in the United States. 0 Thus the New York bank account of
a foreign corporation was in one case held to be a sufficient basis
of jurisdiction for bankruptcy proceedings to be instituted in New
York.31 Any foreign corporation which had its principal place
of business abroad but owned property in this country could thus
file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy wherever it owned property,
and subsequently file a petition under section 77B in the proceeding
already pending. This would give foreign corporations an even
wider choice of courts than is given domestic corporations. It
would allow courts to supervise reorganizations which have only
a fragment of the debtor's property within their jurisdiction. The
detailed administrative work required of a court which approves
a petition under section 77B makes proximity to records, assets,
and parties in interest of the utmost importance.
Section 77B should, if possible, be so interpreted as not to give
foreign corporations the special privilege indicated above. The
devious path which must be blazed through the statutory language
to discover this special privilege makes it likely that the legislators
2SMcKeown and Langeluttig, Federal Debtor Relief Laws, p. 116.
29Section 77B (a), found in (1934) 48 Stat. at L 912, 11 U. S. C. A.
sec. 207(a) (Supp. 1935).3oS6ction 2(1), found in (1898) 30 Stat. at L. 545, 11 U. S. C. A.
sec. 11.
31In re Berthoud, (D.C. N.Y. 1916) 231 Fed. 529.
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did not fully realize the unique opportunities they were confer-
ring on foreign corporations. Nothing has been discovered in the
debates or committee reports to indicate that this problem ever
was considered. The language of the Act is clear and unqualified,
that "the petition shall be filed" in a court in whose territorial
jurisdiction the debtor was incorporated or had its principal place
of business or principal assets. There are no exceptions to this
provision. The courts might both properly and wisely hold that
petitions may be filed in proceedings pending in bankruptcy only
if those proceedings are pending in a jurisdiction where a petition
under section 77B might otherwise be filed.
The debtor's subsidiaries or its creditors may also file petitions
under this Act, but no different problems of jurisdiction arise if a
petition is filed by either of those parties. A subsidiary may file
its petition only "with the court in which such debtor had filed
its petition or answer, and in the same proceeding,"3 2 and creditors
may file their petition only "with the court in which such corpora-
tion might file a petition under this section." 3
WHAT COURT SHOULD APPROVE A PETITION
Having considered the various territorial jurisdictions in which
a petition may be filed, the next problem is to consider under
what circumstances a given judge should approve a petition as filed
in the proper court. Suppose there were a manufacturing com-
pany incorporated in Delaware, with its "principal place of busi-
ness" in New York. A group of creditors first files a petition in
Delaware, and later the debtor company files one in New York.
The court in that district has had matters concerning this corpora-
tion before it for a number of years, and has become familiar
with its affairs. Which petition should be approved? Obviously
the court in New York is best qualified to handle the case. Yet
what should the Delaware court do where a petition is first filed
with it?
The first alternative would be to approve the petition and pro-
ceed with the reorganization. This should not be done. The
distance from the witnesses and property and the existence of a
court so much better equipped to handle the proceedings should
32Section 77B(a), found in (1934) 48 Stat. at L. 912, 11 U. S. C. A.
sec. 207(a) (Supp. 1935).33Section 77B(a), found in (1934) 48 Stat. at L. 913, 11 U. S. C A.
sec. 207(a) (Supp. 1935).
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be a complete defense3 to any petition thus filed. Moreover the
danger of certain interests dominating the reorganization to the
injury of others is aggravated where the proceedings are far from
the center of corporate activities, before a court unacquainted
with the debtor's problems.
Where proceedings are begun by a debtor's petition, the court
may have some difficulty in knowing the facts concerning the
comparative merits of the possible forums, because the Act does
not provide for any notice of filing to be given to other parties
before action on such a petition. Nor is there any provision for
a hearing before such action. The Act merely provides that, "Upon
the filing of such a petition or answer the judge shall enter an
order either approving it as properly filed under this section if
satisfied that such petition or answer complies with this section
and has been filed in good faith, or dismissing it."13 5 The pro-
ceedings are ex parte in nature at least until the judge's disposi-
tion of the petition. It is unfortunate that this is so. The debtor
interests have an opportunity to choose their judge, and have their
petition approved before the opposition gathers its forces. It is
likely to be more difficult to have proceedings transferred or ter-
minated when once begun in a partisan forum, than to have a
petition dismissed originally. Even if the proceedings are trans-
ferred or brought to an early end, time and money have been
wasted in the effort. In the case of creditors' petitions provision
is made for service on the corporation and an answer by it.36
Debtors' petitions might be more satisfactorily adjudicated if some
similar provisions could be made with respect to them.
Practical difficulties are conceded to stand in the way of any
such change. A debtor corporation in urgent need of reorganiza-
tion can ill afford to have the approval of its petition delayed while
it ferrets out each member of its many classes of widely scattered
creditors in order that it may serve notice on them. It might,
however, be provided that notice of the hearing be published both
where the petition is filed and where the debtor was incorporated,
if these places are not the same, so that watchful creditors may
have the opportunity to file an answer and contest approval of the
34For the theory of the defense see the discussion of the court's second
alternative at footnotes 37 to 42 and text.35Section 77B(a), found in (1934) 48 Stat. at L. 912, 11 U. S. C. A.
sec. 207(a) (Supp. 1935).36Section 77B(a), found in (1934) 48 Stat. at L. 913, 11 U. S. C. A.
sec. 207(a) (Supp. 1935).
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debtor's petition. Necessarily the hearing could not be long de-
layed, but creditors would have time at least to raise questions in
the mind of the judge, which might otherwise not come to his
attention, as to the wisdom of approving the petition. Lest credi-
tors scramble for the debtor's assets in the interval before the
hearing, provision might be made for a temporary injunction
against such levies.
The second alternative, in the hypothetical case, would be
for the Delaware court to dismiss the petition as not filed in good
faith." Some judges, notably Judge Julian Mack, have shown
great reluctance to impair the reputation of counsel by finding that
their petition was not filed in good faith, and have refused so to
hold except in extreme cases.3 8 Other courts have given the phrase
as used in section 77B a new and less odious meaning. They have
required, as a prerequisite of a finding of good faith, that there
be likelihood of a successful reorganization," that the debtor be
in need of reorganization, 40 and that the petitioners intend to use
section 77B as a vehicle of reorganization. 41 . "Good faith" as
thus construed provides a badly needed latitude in the exercise of
judicial discretion. The success or failure of the Act depends
largely on its administration by the federal judges, for every cor-
poration seeking reorganization presents unique problems from the
time the petition is filed until the final order is issued. Each court
should require as an element of good faith affirmative proof that
under all the circumstances of the particular case the administra-
t~on and reorganization could be as successfully carried on before
37Either a debtor's or creditors' petition may be approved only if thejudge is "satisfied" that it "has been filed in good faith." Section 7713(a).
found in (1934) 48 Stat. 912, 913, 11 U. S. C. A. sec. 207(a) (Supp. 1935).
It should be noted that a court which has jurisdiction must approve a
petition if it contains the necessary allegations and is found to have been
filjed in good faith. In re Prairie Ave. Bldg. Corp., (D.C. I1. 1935) 11 F.
Supp. 125.381n re Associated Gas and Electric Co., (D.C. N.Y. Oct. 26, 1934)
C. C. H. Bankruptcy Service, Par. 3057.39 lanati Sugar Co. v. Mock, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1935) 75 F. (2d) 284:
In re Williamsport Wire Rope Co., (D.C. Pa. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 481, aff'd.
(C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1935) 78 F. (2d) 1022; In re Coronado Hotel Co., (D.C.
Mo. July 5, 1934) C.C.H. Bankruptcy Service, Par. 3002; In re Hotel Park
Central, (D.C., N.Y. July 5, 1935) C.C.H. Bankruptcy Service, Par. 3545:
In re Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., (Referee's Opinion in N.D. Ill.,
Sept. 12, 1934) C. C. H. Bankruptcy Service, Par. 3061. But compare In
re Surf Bldg. Corp., (D.C. I1. 1934) 11 F. Supp. 295; In re Lehrenkrauss
Corp., (D.C. N.Y. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 14.401n re South Coast Co., (D.C. Del. 1934) 8 F. Supp. 43.41In re South Coast Co., (D.C. Del. 1934) 8 F. Supp. 43.
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it as before any other federal district court. If such a procedure
were conscientiously followed, expensive transfers of proceedings
would be rare; instances of the domination of proceedings by a
few for their own ends would be discouraged and perhaps dimin-
ished; and in most cases the court best equipped to handle the
proceedings would be in charge from the start. "
The third alternative would be for the Delaware court to
approve the original petition and, on a separate petition, allow
the proceedings to be transferred to the southern district of New
York. The Act provides that, "The court shall upon petition
transfer such proceedings to the territorial jurisdiction where the
interests of all the parties will be best subserved.""I
A transfer may be ordered even before a petition is approved."
However, it may be transferred only to a jurisdiction in which it
could have been originally filed." In the hypothetical case there
is compliance with this requirement, for the principal assets were
in the southern district of New York. In considering whether the
proceedings should be transferred, the courts consider where the
debtor's records are, where its officers are, the convenience of
creditors, how far the proceedings have advanced in the jurisdiction
where the petition was approved," and most of all which court
42 In this connection should be considered In re Kelly-Springfield Tire
Co., (D.C. Md. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 414. There it was contended that the
petitioning officers would play a dominant part in the proceedings if their
petition were approved rather than that filed in New York. and that their
petition consequently was not filed in good faith. District Judge Chesnut
said in response, at page 416: "Wherever the affairs of this Company are
administered they will be administered by sonic federal judge for the benefit
of all interests . . .wherever administration is under section 77B it is for
the best interests of all concerned." This dictum ignored the long recognized
dangers, already mentioned ad nauseam, of allowing interested parties to
choose their own reorganization court without regard for the interests and
convenience of all parties concerned. In the case before him Judge Chesnut
held that the interests of all parties were best served by continuing the
proceedings in the Maryland district court.
43Section 77B(a), found in (1934) 48 Stat. at L. 912, 11 U. S. C. A.
sec. 207(a) (Supp. 1935).
44In re Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 419.
See contra, In re Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., (D.C. Md. 1935) 10 F. Supp.
414, 417. Conversely, involuntary proceedings may be transferred to another
district on the petition of the debtor, even where the debtor has previously
answered the creditors' petition. In re Botany Consol. Mills, Inc., (D.C.
Del. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 267.
45In re Midland United Co., (D.C. Del. 1934) 8 F. Supp. 92; In re
Syndicate Oil Corp., (D.C. Del. 1934) 8 F. Supp. 213; see In re Con-
solidated Gas Utilities Co., (D.C. Del. 1934) 8 F. Supp. 385. 386. For a
note giving arguments pro and con this limitation on the right to transfer
proceedings see (1935) 44 Yale L. J. 885.
46In re Syndicate Oil Corp., (D.C. Del. 1934) 9 F. Supp. 127.
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is most conversant with the debtor's affairs, and where the reor-
ganization proceedings could be most successfully continued."'
It is useful to have in the Act such a provision for the transfer
of proceedings. Where a mistake has been made, and a petition
has been approved by one court although another is better equipped
to supervise the proceedings, it is well for a transfer to be ordered.
But transfers take time, may be granted grudgingly, and are likely
to be rather expensive. Moreover, since they are granted only on
petition, one party must take positive action in order for the
transfer provision to effectuate the removal of the proceedings
from an improper to a proper forum. Contrast the effect of the
suggested interpretation of the "good faith" clause, whereby a
court, even in ex parte proceedings, would not approve a petition
until it had been affirmatively shown that it was the court best
fitted to handle the case. If any real progress is to be made toward
having reorganizations conducted in the best possible forum,
courts should not be allowed to forego investigations of proper
venue merely for want of a petition.
CONFLICTS OF JURISDICTION
No matter how careful judges may be to approve petitions
only where they have jurisdiction,"8 and are as well fitted as
4 71n re Consolidated Gas Utilities Co., (D.C. Del. 1934) 8 F. Supp.
385; In re Sierra Salt Corp., (D.C. Nev. 1934) 8 F. Supp. 922; In re
Botany Consol. Mills, Inc., (D.C. Del. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 267; Watters v.
Hamilton Gas Co., (D.C. W.Va. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 323, 333, 334.4 8A federal court of bankruptcy must take cognizance of lack of juris-
diction, and dismiss the proceedings even on its own motion. See In re
Chicago Bank of Commerce, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1932) 61 F. (2d) 986, 988.
In this respect all bankruptcy proceedings should be distinguished from
federal equity consent receiverships, where a jurisdictional defect must be
pleaded. There, where the sole ground of federal jurisdiction is diversity
of citizenship, a corporation may intentionally fail to plead lack of juris-
diction to a petition filed by friendly creditors, and thereby allow the pro-
ceedings to be carried on in any district court of its own selection. Central
Trust Co. v. McGeorge, (1894) 151 U. S. 129, 14 Sup. Ct. 286, 38 L. Ed. 98.
This practice of appointing an equity receiver in a federal district where
neither of the parties resides, has, however, been criticised by the state
courts of Delaware and New Jersey. See Billig, Corporate Reorganization:
Equity vs. Bankruptcy, (1933) 17 MINNESOTA LAW REviEw 237, 254. There
is some reason to believe that it is within the power of a court of equity
to decline jurisdictiqn of its own motion in such a case. See the language
of Woolsey, J., in Municipal Financial Corp. v. Bankus Corp., (D.C. N.Y.
1930) 45 F. (2d) 902, 906, to the effect that: "A remedy of this kind
should only be granted when the court is satisfied from the papers before
it that the curative purpose for which the remedy is sought may be accom-
plished, and that a remedy equally adequate and appropriate to the circum-
stances cannot be elsewhere found." Cf. Harkin v. Brundage, (1928) 276
U. S. 36, 50-52, 48 Sup. Ct. 268, 72 L. Ed. 457.
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anyone to administer the reorganization, cases will arise where
two or more courts approve petitions and assume "exclusive juris-
diction." Two problems spring from such cases. First, where
two or more courts approve petitions and all have acknowledged
territorial jurisdiction, in which court should the proceedings be
continued? Second, where two or more petitions are filed, which
court should act first to decide questions of jurisdiction and ex-
pediency?
These problems, among others, were raised in a case of unusual
jurisdictional complications.49 The Hamilton Gas Company was
incorporated in Delaware to produce gas for sale at wholesale to
pipe-line companies. Its properties were chiefly in West Virginia,
but some were located in Kentucky. Its prodigal president, W. A.
Lamer, occupied executive offices in New York. In 1932 re-
ceivers were appointed in West Virginia, Kentucky, Delaware, and
New York. The business was carried on by them with success
until 1934. In these years most of the actual business was trans-
acted in West Virginia. On June 7, 1934, creditors filed a peti-
tion in West Virginia under section 77B. On June 8 the debtor,
through Mr. Larner, filed a petition in New York which was
approved on June 9 by the New York court, thereby giving that
court "exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property wher-
ever located." On June 21 the West Virginia court approved the
creditors' petition with like effect. On appeal from that decision,
the circuit court of appeals for the fourth circuit held, on January
9, 1935, that if the principal place of business was in New York
and the southern district of New York had jurisdiction, the West
Virginia proceedings should be transferred to that court, but that
if the southern district court of New York did not have jurisdic-
tion then the southern district court of West Virginia should retain
jurisdiction, since the "principal assets" of the debtor were indu-
bitably within the latter's territory. 0  The proceedings were re-
manded to the southern district court of West Virginia, where it
was decided, on April 8, 1935, that the southern district court of
New York did not have jurisdiction.5 Meanwhile, on February
15, 1935, the New York court entered an order which declared that
49Hamilton Gas Company v. Watters, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1935) 75 F. (2d)
176. 50Hamilton Gas Co. v. Watters, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1935) 75 F. (2d) 176.
For a discussion of this phase of the case, see Spaeth and Friedberg, Early
Developments Under Section 77B, (1935) 30 Ill. L. Rev. 137, 141.51Watters v. Hamilton Gas Co., (D.C. W.Va. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 323.
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it had exclusive jurisdiction. The next day it resettled the order
to allow the proceedings in West Virginia to be prosecuted to
completion.52
Thus after ten months of wrangling for jurisdiction the fact
was, in April, 1935, that one district court in New York and
another in West Virginia had each decreed that it had "exclusive
jurisdiction of the debtor and its property wherever located."
Reorganization had been delayed; administration of the estate by
the courts had been prolonged; fees due to trustees, committees,
and counsel had been greatly increased.
Finally on July 22, 1935, the jurisdictional log jam was broken
by a decision of the circuit court of appeals for the second circuit
which reversed the decision of the district court for the southern
district of New York that it had jurisdiction.5 3 Even then delays
and expenses did not cease, for application was made to the Su-
preme Court for a writ of certiorari which was not denied until
December 9, 1935.11
First, let it be assumed that both the New York and West
Virginia courts had jurisdiction; that the principal place of busi-
ness was in the territory of the former, the principal assets in
the territory of the latter. The creditors' petition was filed first.
Both petitions were approved, but that of the debtor before that
of the- creditors. As already mentioned, the circuit court of appeals
for the fourth circuit indicated that in such a situation the New
York court, which first approved the debtor's petition, should retain
jurisdiction.5
The court first stated the usual rule that "as between two
courts of concurrent and co-ordinate jurisdiction, the court which
first obtains jurisdiction and constructive possession of property
by the filing of a bill is entitled to retain it without interference.""0
It then declared that Congress varied this rule under section 77B
by providing, although indirectly, that the first court to approve
a debtor's petition should have jurisdiction over the proceedings
thereafter. In support of its conclusion, it pointed to that part of
section 77B(a) which provides that the court which approves a
52Watters v. Hamilton Gas Co., (D.C. W.Va. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 323,
333.53 1n re Hamilton Gas Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1935) 79 F. (2d) 97.
5480 L. Ed. 222.
55Hamilton Gas Co. v. Watters, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1935) 75 F. (2d) 176.
-cHamilton Gas Co. v. Watters, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1935) 75 F. (2d)
176, at p. 178, citing Harkin v. Brundage, (1928) 276 U. S. 36, 43.
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debtor's petition shall "have exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor
and its property wherever located." With this it compared the
apparently conflicting provision that if a creditors' petition is ap-
proved "the proceedings thereon shall continue with like effect as
if the corporation had itself filed the petition or answer under
this section." '57 In the following language the court indicated how
the conflict could be reconciled:
"Both clauses may be given effect, if preference is given to the
debtor's petition, even though a creditors' petition has been pre-
viously filed, but not previously approved. In short, since the
debtor is not forbidden to file a petition after the filing of one
by creditors, 5 , it is reasonable to assume that the debtor may file
its petition and secure the approval thereof at any time prior to
action upon a creditors' petition, even though the latter be pre-
viously filed. The provision that the proceeding on the creditors'
petition shall be continued after its approval as if the proceeding
had been instituted by the debtor may fairly be interpreted to
mean that, after the approval of a petition of either kind, the
course of the proceeding shall be the same; and the provision for
exclusive jurisdiction, upon the approval of the debtor's petition,
may be given effect by denying to any other court thereafter the
power to approve and to proceed with a creditors' petition."85
The court then proceeded fufther to substantiate its conclusion
that the first tribunal to approve a petition should have jurisdic-
tion. It showed that section 77B(k) and (o)60 incorporate within
the Corporate Reorganizations Act the General Orders in Bank-
ruptcy 68 including General Order Number 6, which provides
inter alia that "the court which makes the first adjudication of
57Section 77B(a), found in (1934) 48 Stat. at L. 913, 11 U. S. C. A.
sec. 207(a) (Supp. 1935).581t is provided in Section 77B(a) that creditors may file a petition
only "if such corporation has not filed a petition or answer under this sec-
tion."59Hamilton Gas Co. v. Watters, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1935) 75 F. (2d) 176,
180. 60Section 77B(k) provides in part that "All other (those excluded are
not here material) provisions of this Act, except such as are inconsistent
with the provisions of this section 77B, shall apply to proceedings instituted
under this section." (1934) 48 Stat. at L. 921, 11 U. S. C. A. sec. 207(a)(Supp. 1935). Section 77B(o) provides that "In proceedings under this sec-
tion and consistent with the.provisions thereof, the jurisdiction and powers of
the court ... shall be the same as if a voluntary petition for adjudication
had been filed and a decree of adjudication had been entered on the day
when the debtor's petition or answer was approved." (1935) 48 Stat.
at L. 922, 11 U. S. C. A. sec. 207(a) (Supp. 1934).
61Section 30 provides that "All necessary rules, forms and orders as to
procedure and for carrying this Act into force and effect shall be prescribed,
and may be amended from time to time, by the Supreme Court of the United
States." (1898) 30 Stat. at L. 554, 11 U. S. C. A. sec. 53.
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bankruptcy shall retain jurisdiction over all proceedings therein
until the same shall be closed."8 2
Although the conclusions of the court were mere dicta, it is
likely that they will be followed where there are conflicts between
courts which have acknowledged territorial jurisdiction. The fol-
lowing is a summary of these conclusions. (1) Where a credi-
tors' petition is filed and approved, a debtor's petition is then of
no avail. (2) Where a creditors' and a debtor's petition are
filed in that order and approved in reverse order, the court ap-
proving the debtor's petition has jurisdiction. 3 (3) However, in
that situation, if the creditors' petition is first approved, the court
so acting probably has jurisdiction thereafter by the terms of
General Order No. 6.64 (4) By the same token if two groups of
creditors file petitions with different courts the first court to
approve a petition has jurisdiction. (5) Where a debtor's petition
or answer is first filed a creditors' petition may not thereafter be
filed, to say nothing of being approved.65
The rules thus far set forth define which court shall have juris-
diction after the approval of one or more petitions. They do not
prevent races for hasty and inadequately considered approval. They
do not decide which court should determine questions of doubtful
jurisdiction or which should select, in the first instance, the tribunal
best fitted to take charge of the reorganization. This problem of
priority of courts is the second raised by the various cases in-
volving the Hamilton Gas Company.
Where two or more petitions are filed "against""0 the debtor
62(1898) 172 U. S. 654.
6
31n one case a creditors' petition was followed by that of the debtor
in the same court. The latter was first approved, and the creditors' petition
was dismissed. In re National Department Stores, Inc., (D.C. Del. 1934)
8 F. Supp. 19. In another case the debtor's petition was filed after that of
the creditors, but in a different court. The debtor's petition was first ap-
proved, and the proceedings under the creditors' petition were transferred
to the forum selected by the debtor. In re Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., (D.C.
N.Y. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 419. It has been contended, however, that the
debtor must answer a prior creditors' petition before it can file one of its
own. Oliver, The Corporate Reorganization Amendment to the Bankruptcy
Act. (1935) 9 Temple L. Q. 144, 151-153.
64Note 62 supra and text. See also Humphrey v. Bankers Mortgage
Co., (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1935) 79 F. (2d) 345, 350.65See Note 58. Where one creditors' petition is filed and approved
after answer by the debtor, another creditors' petition may not be filed. In
re Middle West Utilities Co., (D.C. Del. 1934) 9 F. Supp. 38.
r6Section 1(1) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that "'A person against
whom a petition has been filed,' shall include a person who has filed a volun
tary petition," (1898) 30 Stat. at L. 544, 11 U. S. C. A. sec. 1(1).
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and one is filed in the district where the debtor has his domicile,
General Order No. 6 provides that "the first hearing shall be had
in the district in which the debtor has his domicile." 7 This Order
has been held to be applicable to corporations. 8 Presumably this
also applies under section 77B so that where two petitions are filed,
one in the state of the debtor's incorporation, a court in such state
would have priority. If it approved the petition it would have
jurisdiction. In many cases, as in the Hamilton Gas Case no peti-
tion is filed in the state of the debtor's incorporation, so that Gen-
eral Order No. 6 does not solve the problem. Moreover, since
a corporation's state of incorporation is so often far removed
from the center of its activities, priority should not be given to
the courts on the basis of corporate domicile.
Under the older sections of the Bankruptcy Act and General
Order No. 6 it was held, in the case of partnerships, that the
court with which a petition was first filed should decide which of
two courts could proceed with the case for the greatest convenience
of the parties in interest.69 It was similarly held that where there
was doubt as to the domicile or principal place of business of a
debtor, the court with which a petition was first filed should have
jurisdiction to decide the question of proper venue and that the
other courts with which petitions were filed should stay proceed-
ings to await the result of the first court's investigation. t 0
If corporate reorganizations are to be facilitated, the courts
must see to it that the priority of hearings under section 77B is
clarified in some such manner. There must be no repetition of the
disgraceful eighteen-month struggle for jurisdiction in the Ham il-
ton Gas Case. There should be a definite rule as to which court,
of those with which petitions are filed, shall have the power first
to decide not only whether it has jurisdiction, but also whether
it is best fitted to supervise the reorganization. It should also
be set out in what order other courts should act if the court which
is granted priority dismisses the petition. Priority should be
fixed by a standard which is definite, which covers all situations,
yet which as accurately as possible, consistently with the first two
67(1898) 172 U. S. 654.
681n re United Button Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1904) 132 Fed. 378; In re
Globe Sec. Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1904) 132 Fed. 709; In re New Era Novelty
Co., (D.C. N.J. 1916) 241 Fed. 298.
69In re Sterne & Levi, (D.C. Tex. 1911) 190 Fed. 70.701n re Waxelbaum, (D.C. N.Y. 1899) 98 Fed. 589; In re Elmira Steel
Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1901) 109 Fed. 456; In re Tybo Mining & Reduction Co.,
(D.C. Nev. 1904) 132 Fed. 697.
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qualifications, represents the court best fitted to supervise the
reorganization.
What test of priority might be prescribed which woucl answer
these requirements? Where one of the courts in which a petition
is filed has appointed a primary receiver of the debtor in prior
receivership proceedings, its familiarity with the debtor's affairs
should entitle it to the first say as to where proceedings under
section 77B should be conducted.
If none of the courts petitioned has so acted. which court
should take precedence? As already pointed out the location of
a corporation's domicile should not be determinative, for it has
no necessary connection with the site of the corporate activities.
where most of the witnesses and records are likely to be found.
Petitions filed with courts in whose territory the principal place of
business or principal assets of the debtor are alleged (with some
basis in fact) to be located might wisely be given precedence in
the order of filing. Finally could be ranked, also in the order of
filing, those petitions filed with courts whose jurisdiction is alleged
to rest solely on hte fact that the debtor was incorporated within
the bounds of its state.
There has been some suggestion in the cases that a debtor's
petition, where filed promptly after that of creditors, should he
given priority because section 77B is "for the relief of debtors."' ,
The purpose of the Act is, however, to readjust the affairs of
debtor corporations so that the interests not only of the debtor
but also of creditors, employees. and the public may be preserved
and protected in so far as possible.7 2 Experience has shown the
debtor to be more likely than others to misuse the Act. Moreover
the so-called debtor's petition may be merely a cloak for the petition
of alert creditors who oppose the group of creditors who filed an
earlier petition. 73 The hearing on a petition should not lie given
preference solely because it was filed by the debtor.
The suggested solution of the problem would work as follows
in the Hamilton Gas Case. After the filing of the creditors'
and debtor's petitions, the West Virginia court. vith which the
former was filed, would be the first court to consider whether the
7 1See Humphrey v. Bankers Mortgage Co., (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1935)
79 F. (2d) 345, 350, and cases cited therein.72See In re Studebaker Corp.. (D.C. Ind. 1935) 9 F. Supp. 426. 428.73Spaeth and Friedberg. Early Developments Under Section 77B. (1935)
30 Ill. L. Rev. 137, 143; In re South Coast Co., (D.C. Del. 1934) 8 F.
Supp. 43.
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creditors' petition should be approved. It will be remembered
that the primary receiver had been appointed by that court and
that most of the debtor's property had been located in its jurisdic-
tion. The West Virginia court would then find that it had juris-
diction because the "principal assets" of the debtor were located in
its territory. It would then determine whether the proceedings
might best be conducted there or elsewhere. On the facts of the
Hamilton Gas Case, if the question had come up, the Vest Vir-
ginia court should have found originally that it was best qualified
to handle the case. If, however, it found in favor of the Southern
District Court of New York on this score, it would consider
whether the New York court had jurisdiction. An affirmative
answer should result in the dismissal of the petition as not filed in
good faith, and the subsequent opening of hearings in the New
York court, the only other court with which a petition was filed.
If it were found that the New York court did not have jurisdic-
tion, it would decide whether it was the next best court, of those
with which petitions were filed, to supervise the proceedings. If
it found in its own favor, it would approve the petition provided
the other requisites under the Act were satisfied. After approval
of the petition the court would have full power to transfer the
proceedings to another district if it should later seem best so to do.
The jurisdiction of the court which approved the petition
could still be attacked in collateral proceedings,- but the dangers
of disputes over jurisdiction would be minimized if an orderly
sequence of hearings were thus prescribed. That such regulations
might have the force of law, it is suggested that the Supreme
Court, under its authority granted by section 30 of the Bankruptcy
Act, as incorporated in section 77B, 5 should adopt a new general
order in bankruptcy to supplant General Orders Numbers 6 and
7,76 in so far as they apply to proceedings under section 77B. The
following is submitted as the possible form of such an order:
74Watters v. Hamilton Gas Co., (D.C. W.Va. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 323,
333.
75See footnotes 60 and 61.
-
6General Order No. 7 regulates priority of petitions, filed with the same
court, according to the chronological order of the acts of bankruptcy alleged
therein. (1898) 172 U. S. 655, Under section 77B creditors need not allege
an act of bankruptcy "if a prior proceeding in bankruptcy or equity receiver-
ship is" pending. (1934) 48 Stat. at L. 913, 11 U. S. C. A. sec. 207(a)
(Supp. 1935). General Order No. 7 is thus of no aid in many proceedings
under section 77B, and does not help to determine the court best equipped
to reorganize the debtor.
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In case two or more petitions are filed in different districts
against" a debtor corporation under section 77B, the first hearing
shall be had in the district in which a primary receiver of the
debtor had previously been appointed, or, if there be none such,
then hearings shall be held in the following order: first, in the
order in which such petitions are filed, in those courts in whose
territorial jurisdiction it is alleged (with some basis in fact) that
the debtor has its principal place of business or principal assets;
second, in the order in which such petitions are filed, in those
courts with which petitions are filed which allege as the sole basis
of jurisdiction that the debtor is incorporated in the state in
which the court is located. The proceedings upon the other
petition shall be stayed until an adjudication is made upon the
petition first heard; and if the petition first heard is approved,
the court which so decrees shall retain exclusive jurisdiction over
all proceedings until the same shall be closed. But the court so
retaining jurisdiction shall, if satisfied that the interests of all
the parties will be best subserved if another court proceeds with
the cases, and that such other court has jurisdiction, order them
to be transferred to that court.
If the petition first heard is dismissed, the remaining petitions
shall be adjudicated according to the priorities above prescribed.
In case two or more petitions are filed against a debtor corpora-
tion in the same district under section 77B, they shall be heard
in the order of filing.
This order supplants General Orders Ntimber 6 and 7, insofar
as they are applicable to proceedings under section 77B.
Such an order would regulate the mechanics of venue. It
would be left in the discretion of each judge to determine whether
his court, of those which have jurisdiction and have been peti-
tioned, is best equipped to proceed with the case. Under such an
Order, as in all phases of proceedings under section 77B, the.
public benefits to be derived from the Act would depend on the
integrity and wisdom of the federal judges.
"'See footnote 66.
